Turning Points

Military historians are forever debating when the advantage in a conflict shifts from one combatant to the other. These shifts, or turning points, are ephemeral. It’s difficult, even in retrospect, to ascertain at what point during a war that the momentum actually changed. That’s why there is debate. In most cases, there is no truly correct answer to the debate.

I was prodded to consider this topic while reading Bruce Catton’s Glory Road, the second in a three-volume study of the Army of the Potomac’s role in the American Civil War. Catton maintains that the turning point in the war came after the union army’s humiliating defeat at Chancellorsville, not at the subsequent battle of Gettysburg, which many often cite as the war’s turning point.

Although President Abraham Lincoln was deeply distressed after Chancellorsville, Catton maintains that the army and the country were already inured to defeat and were now determined to carry on to victory no matter how long it took, or how many casualties occurred. This hardening of the spirit set up, in effect, the victory at Gettysburg in July of 1863. In spite of the terrible leadership, in spite of the terrible mistakes that had caused so many casualties, in spite of the brilliant leadership of their principal adversary, this hardening of the spirit had transformed the Army of the Potomac into a professional army that would persist until things finally turned their way. The union and the army owned obvious advantages over the Confederacy, and once the army and the public hardened and accepted the necessity of hardship and death it was only a matter of time before the Confederacy collapsed.

In this respect, I see a distinct parallel between the American Civil War in the East and the German-Soviet conflict. Despite one tactical victory after another, the Confederacy was farther from victory after Chancellorsville than at the start of the war. So it was with Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht in its quest to destroy the Soviet Union.

In the early stages of Barbarossa, the code name for the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, the German Heer and Luftwaffe produced a string of tactical victories unprecedented in their scope. Millions of Red Army soldiers were eliminated from the field in the breathtakingly swift double envelopments of the Wehrmacht. With the Luftwaffe providing devastatingly effective close air support, the German army trapped and destroyed the Red Army in huge chunks. The chief of the German army’s general staff Franz Halder was convinced that the war against the Soviets had been won in the first two weeks of the campaign.

In spite of the terrible losses, the Red Army fought on. So what was the turning point in the German-Soviet war? Was it Stalingrad in 1942? Or Kursk in 1943? Maybe Smolensk in 1941?

Unfortunately there is no clear answer to that question. The prevailing opinion in the German high command was that the war was effectively lost when Operation Typhoon finally ground to a halt in November 1941. Typhoon was the final phase of Barbarossa, the last, desperate lunge to encircle Moscow. Typhoon failed, the Red Army counterattacked and the tide had turned.

I agree with the German high command. Typhoon had been delayed too long. When it concluded with the Germans extended well beyond their supply lines and the winter in place the campaign momentum had shifted irretrievably to the Soviets.

Good arguments can certainly be made for other points as well. The early German operational victories had horribly damaged and weakened the Red Army. It certainly was not at the time readily apparent to the world that the turning point had arrived. There was much death and destruction left to occur before the Red Army finally battered the Germans back to Berlin. But the writing was on the wall in December 1941.

Turning points are always an interesting topic for debate.